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THE GISSEL DOCTRINE: WHEN
A BARGAINING ORDER WILL ISSUE
DANIEL M. CARSON*
0 N June 16, 1969, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.," a landmark case which was the last
major labor decision of the Warren Court. In Gissel, the Court rejected the
National Labor Relations Board's then existing standard for the issuance of
bargaining orders, and prescribed an entirely new standard. The purpose of
this article is to analyze Gissel and the Gissel family of cases in an attempt
to delineate the circumstances in which a bargaining order will issue.
I. THE Gissel DECISION
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. was a consolidation of three cases which
were appealed from the Fourth CircuitF and one case on appeal from the
First Circuit.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve,
inter alia, the differences among the circuits on various issues relating to
union authorization cards. The four cases, each of which has a similar
factual background, presented the following questions for determination
by the Court: 4
1. Can the duty to bargain arise without a Board election?
2. Are unambiguous authorization cards, obtained without misrepre-
sentation or coercion, reliable enough to provide a valid route to majority
status?
3. Is a collective bargaining order an appropriate remedy when the
employer rejects a card majority, undermines a union majority by unfair
labor practices, and makes a fair election an unlikely possibility?
A. Factual Background
The uncomplicated factual situations which gave rise to the four cases
can be briefly described as follows:' The union waged an organizational
* Assistant General Counsel to Proctor Silex, Inc., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Formerly
associated with the firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom, New York, New York;
member of the New York Bar. Mr. Carson received his J.D. from Fordham Law School,
where he served as Articles Editor of this Review.
1. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
2. General Steel Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Heck's,
Inc., 398 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1968).
3. NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968).
4. 395 U.S. at 579. See notes 22-51 infra and accompanying text. A fourth issue decided,
but unrelated to this inquiry, was whether certain specific statements by the employer were
protected by the first amendment. 395 U.S. at 616-20.
5. See 395 U.S. at 580-90.
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campaign and obtained authorization cards from a majority of employees in
the appropriate unit. In each case, the authorization card was an unambigu-
ous request for representation status. Each union demanded recognition
by the employer as the sole bargaining agent for the various units. The
respective employers refused, claiming that authorization cards are in-
herently unreliable. Vigorous antiunion campaigns followed, giving rise
to numerous unfair labor practice charges. In two of the cases, elections
were held, and in each case the employer was the victor.0 In another case,
the union-petitioned election was never held due to unfair labor practice
charges subsequently brought against the employer. 7 In the remaining case,
the union, without seeking an election, brought unfair labor practice
charges against the employer."
The Board found that in each case the employees had signed cards which
unambiguously authorized the union to represent the employees as their
exclusive bargaining agent.9 In no case did the authorization card make
any reference to an election.
The Board also found in each case that the employer's refusal to bargain
was not based upon a "good faith doubt," but on a desire to gain sufficient
time to dissipate the union's majority status. This finding was based on
evidence of unfair labor practices committed by the employer in each case
in his attempt to defeat union recognition. 10 Consequently, the Board set
aside the two elections that had been held, and ordered all four of the
employers to bargain with the respective unions.
On appeal of the three cases arising in the Fourth Circuit, the court of
appeals sustained the Board's findings of §§ 8(a) (1) and (3) violations,
but reversed the § 8(a) (5) refusal to bargain determination and refused
6. General Steel Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 339, 340 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v.
Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157 (Ist Cir. 1968).
7. NLRB v. Heck's, Inc., 398 F.2d 337, 338 (4th Cir. 1968).
8. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.2d 336, 337 (4th Cir. 1968).
9. "Typical of the cards was the one used in the Charleston campaign in Heck's, and it
stated in relevant part: 'Desiring to become a member of the above Union of the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, I
hereby make application for admission to membership. I hereby authorize you, your agents or
representatives to act for me as collective bargaining agent on all matters pertaining to rates
of pay, hours, or any other conditions of employment.'" 395 U.S. at 583 n.4.
10. The Board found the employers to be in violation of §§ 8(a)(1), (3) & (5) of the
National Labor Relations Act. 395 U.S. at 583. Section 8 of the NLRA provides in pertinent
part: "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-() to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of [their] rights . . .; (3) by discrimination In
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization ... ; (5) to refuse to bargain collectively
with the representatives of his employees . .." 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970).
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to enforce the Board's bargaining order." The court based the § 8(a) (5)
decisions upon the premise that the cards were inherently unreliable and,
consequently, insufficient basis upon which an employer may be ordered to
bargain.12
On appeal of the case arising in the First Circuit, the court of appeals
took a different approach to the reliability of authorization cards, found
the necessary violations, and enforced the Board's collective bargaining
order. 13
B. The Unfair Labor Practices
Before discussing the decision of the Supreme Court in Gissel, it is
essential to take note of the unfair labor practice charges sustained in the
various cases. Ultimately, it is the enormity of these violations which will
determine the propriety of a bargaining order in a given situation.
In Gissel, at the outset of the union's organizational campaign, the em-
ployer threatened two employees with discharge if they engaged in union
activity. These employees were subsequently discharged. The union ob-
tained authorization cards from thirty-one of the forty-seven employees
in the appropriate unit and demanded recognition. Rejecting the union's
demand, the employer began interrogating employees, spying on union
meetings to determine the identity of union supporters, and making prom-
ises of greater benefits than the union was able to offer. A vice-president
of the employer warned the employees that "'[i] f the Union got in, he'd
just take his money and let the Union run the place.' ,'4
In Heck's, the employer interrogated employees, discharged the leading
union advocate and threatened reprisals (reduced hours, fewer raises,
and withdrawal of bonuses) if the union was victorious. Further, the
employer offered two known union supporters better jobs if they would
attempt to "break up the union."'" These unfair labor practices were in re-
sponse to the union's demand for recognition at various company ware-
houses. The initial demand was based upon thirteen authorization cards
from a unit of twenty-six employees. The union subsequently obtained
the additional card necessary to establish a majority.'6 The employer
engaged in essentially the same practices a year later when the union de-
ll. General Steel Prods, Inc. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 339, 340 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v.
Heck's, Inc., 398 F.2d 337, 338 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co, 398 F.2d 336,
337 (4th Cir. 1968).
12. 395 U.S. at 585-86.
13. NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157, 161-62 (1st Cir. 1968).
14. Gissel Packing Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 1065, 1075 (1966).
15. Heck's, Inc., 166 NJL.R.B. 674, 677 (1967).
16. Id. at 676.
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manded recognition at another location based upon authorization cards
from twenty-one of the thirty-eight employees in the unit.y7
In General Steel, the employer interrogated employees as to their union
involvement, threatened to discharge them, and warned them of economic
reprisals.' The union demand was based upon possession of one hundred
twenty-two cards from the two hundred seven employees in the unit."0
In Sinclair, the employer told the employees that if the union were
elected, a strike would probably follow and that "a strike 'could lead to
the closing of the plant.' 02o Letters to the same effect were sent to the em-
ployees' homes. Just prior to the election, the employer sent out pamphlets
impugning the teamsters and again indicating that the election of the
union would lead to the closing of the plant."
It is important to note that in each of these cases the unfair labor
practices charged were of a serious nature including threats of economic
reprisal and discharge. In all but Sinclair, these were compounded by
employee interrogation and promises of benefits.
C. The Supreme Court Decision
1. Authorization Cards and the Duty to Bargain
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to refuse to bargain with the representative of
his employees. 2 While the Act further provides that the representative
designated or selected by the employees as bargaining agent shall act as
their exclusive bargaining agent, 3 it does not specify any particular
method of designation. The Act, however, does permit an employer to
petition the Board for an election when one or more labor organizations
have demanded recognition.24
One issue facing the Gissel Court concerned the interpretation and in-
terrelationship of these sections of the NLRA. Specifically, the Court had
to decide "whether a union can establish a bargaining obligation by means
other than a Board election .... ',2" The Court pointed out that al-
though an election is the "preferred" method of obtaining union recogni-
17. See 166 N.L.R.B. 674.
18. General Steel Prods., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 636, 639 (1966).
19. Id. at 648.
20. Sinclair Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 261, 263 (1967).
21. Id. at 264.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970).
23. Id. § 159(a).
24. Id. § 159(c)(1)(B).
25. 395 U.S. at 595.
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tion, it is well recognized that an election is not the sole means available
for obtaining recognition.20
In fact, from the union's standpoint, the election is, at best, a second
resort in the organization of a particular unit. The union will generally
direct its campaign toward obtaining authorization cards from a majority
of employees in the unit for presentation to the employer along with a
formal demand for recognition.
A substantial problem which has plagued both the Board and the courts
has been a determination of the circumstances under which the employer
may refuse to recognize the union's card majority and either petition for
an election, demand that the union petition for an election, or do nothing
at all.
Until recently, the Board had followed the Joy Silk doctrine,' 7 its tradi-
tional approach to this problem. Under this doctrine, "an employer could
lawfully refuse to bargain with a union claiming representative status
through possession of authorization cards if he had a 'good faith doubt'
as to the union's majority status. 28 In such a case, the employer could
insist that the union petition for an election. -9
A finding of bad faith by the Board was a sufficient basis for the is-
suance of a bargaining order under the Joy Silk doctrine. Such a finding
could be premised upon either an employer's failure to come forth with
any reason to doubt the union's representational status, or a finding of
unfair labor practices on the part of the employer. In the latter case, the
unfair labor practices served as an indication that the employer's refusal
to recognize the union was based solely upon a desire to gain sufficient
time to dissipate the union's majority status30
The Joy Silk doctrine was modified by the Board's holding in Aaron
Brothers Co. 31 which shifted the burden of proving the employer's bad
faith to the Board. This limitation was significant because it meant that
not every unfair labor practice would result in a finding of bad faith, and
it relieved the employer of the burden of having to establish a basis for
his "good faith doubt.132
Because the Joy Silk doctrine, even as modified by Aaron Brothers,
retained the "good faith doubt" test, it required an investigation into the
26. See id. at 597, citing United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62
(1956).
27. Joy Silk Miflls, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), enforced, 185 F.2d 732 (1950), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
28. 395 U.S. at 592, citing Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. at 1264.
29. 395 U.S. at 592; 85 N.L.R.B. at 1264.
30. 395 U.S. at 592-93.
31. 158 NJ..R.B. 1077 (1966).
32. 395 U.S. at 593-94.
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employer's subjective intention in his refusal to recognize the union. Ac-
cording to the Gissel Court, this limitation prompted the Board to aban-
don the doctrine, and to adopt a new practice which it put into effect
just prior to the argument of Gissel before the Supreme Court." In Gis-
sel, the Supreme Court gave judicial sanction to the abandonment of the
Joy Silk doctrine and adopted the Board's new practice as the correct rule
to be applied in authorization card cases. 4
Briefly, the Board policy as adopted by the Court may be stated as
follows:
When confronted by a recognition demand based on possession of cards allegedly
signed by a majority of his employees, an employer need not grant recognition imme-
diately, but may, unless he has knowledge independently of the cards that the union
has a majority, decline the union's request and insist on an election, either by request-
ing the union to file an election petition or by filing such a petition himself under
§ 9(c)(1)(B). If, however, the employer commits independent and substantial unfair
labor practices disruptive of election conditions, the Board may withhold the election
or set it aside, and issue instead a bargaining order as a remedy for the various viola-
tions. A bargaining order will not issue, of course, if the union obtained the cards
through misrepresentation or coercion or if the employer's unfair labor practices are
unrelated generally to the representation campaign.3 5
In adopting this rule, however, the Court expressly limited itself to a
situation in which an employer has committed unfair labor practices:
"In short, a union's right to rely on cards as a freely interchangeable
substitute for elections where there has been no election interference is
not put in issue here; we need only decide whether the cards are reliable
enough to support a bargaining order where a fair election probably could
not have been held, or where an election that was held was in fact set
aside." 6
In this respect, however, it is interesting to note that the Court also
stated that "an employer is not obligated to accept a card check as proof
of majority status, under the Board's current practice, and he is not re-
quired to justify his insistence on an election by making his own investiga-
tion of employee sentiment and showing affirmative reasons for doubting
the majority status.13 Thus, it would seem that the Court excluded from
33. See id. at 594. Since this appears to have been the first announcement of Its new
rule, most of the Board's bargaining orders before the courts at the time Gissel was decided
were phrased in terms of "good faith doubt." But see Lewis, Gissel Packing: Was the Supreme
Court Right?, 56 A.B.A.J. 877 (1970), where the author concludes that "[it was the Court,
not the board, which 'abandoned' Joy Silk." Id. at 878.
34. 395 U.S. at 600.
35. Id. at 591-92 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 601 n.18.
37. Id. at 609.
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its decision only the very limited situation in which an employer, faced
with a representation demand based upon authorization cards, neither de-
mands an election nor commits any unfair labor practices. The duty of
that employer was left for future court determination.
2. Inherent Reliability of Authorization Cards
With respect to this inquiry, it is again important to note that the
Gissel Court expressly limited its discussion to unambiguous authoriza-
tion cards and did not consider the effect of "dual-purpose cards." 8
The employers argued that authorization cards are inherently unreliable
and should not be the basis for an order to bargain. In support of their
contention, they argued that cards are signed before the employer has
had an opportunity to present his argument and, more importantly, that
they are tainted by misrepresentation and coercion.
The Court was unpersuaded by these arguments and found that the
Board's Cumberland Shoe doctrine39 adequately insured the employees'
free choice.40 That doctrine, as explained to the Court by the Board, is
as follows:
Thus the fact that employees are told in the course of solictation that an election is
contemplated, or that a purpose of the card is to make an election possible, provides
in our view insufficient basis in itself for vitiating unambiguously worded authorization
cards on the theory of misrepresentation. A different situation is presented, of course,
where union organizers solicit cards on the explicit or indirectly expressed representa-
tion that they will use such cards only for an election and subsequently seek to use
them for a different purpose ....
The foregoing does not of course imply that a finding of misrepresentation is con-
fined to situations where employees are expressly told in haec verbac that the "sole"
or "only" purpose of the cards is to obtain an election. The Board has never suggested
such a mechanistic application of the foregoing principles, as some have contended.
The Board looks to substance rather than to form. It is not the use or nonuse of certain
key or "magic" words that is controlling, but whether or not the totality of circum-
stances surrounding the card solicitation is such, as to add up to an assurance to the
card signer that his card will be used for no purpose other than to help get an election. 41
38. Id. at 606. A dual-purpose card is a card which on its face states that it may be used
either to get an election or to obtain representation status.
39. Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963), followed in NLRB v. C & P
Plaza Dep't Store, 414 F.2d 1244, 1248 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1058 (1970) ;
Kawneer Co. v. NLRB, 413 F.2d 191, 199 (6th Cir. 1969); UAW v. NLRB, 392 F.2d 801,
807 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 906 (1968); NLRB v. Swan Super Cleaners,
Inc., 384 F.2d 609, 619 (6th Cir. 1967).
40. 395 U.S. at 606-09.
41. Id. at 608 n.27, quoting Levi Strauss & Co., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 57 (June 28, 1968),
1968-2 CCH NLRB Dec. 20,043, at 25,123 & n.7. However, the Court cautioned the Board
against applying too rigid an interpretation of this rule and stated that the trial examiner's
findings in General Steel, 157 N.L.R.B. 636 (1966), represent the limits of the Cumberland
Rules application. 395 U.S. at 608-09. The examiner in General Steel rejected the employer's
FORDIJAM LAW REVIEW
3. The Bargaining Order as an Appropriate Remedy
It has long been the rule that upon a finding of unfair labor practices
which have undermined a union's majority status or made the holding of
a fair election unlikely, the Board is not limited to a cease-and-desist
order, but has the authority to issue a bargaining order.42 The purpose
of the bargaining order is "as much to remedy past election damage as it
is to deter future misconduct."4
The Gissel Court, in establishing guidelines to determine the propriety
of a bargaining order in a given situation, set up three categories in which
the need for a bargaining order might arise. The first category concerns
cexceptional" cases, where the presence of "outrageous" and "pervasive"
unfair labor practices justify imposing a bargaining order. Such an order
is appropriate even "without need of inquiry into majority status on the
basis of cards or otherwise.""
In the second situation described by the Court, a bargaining order is
justified upon a finding that the unfair labor practices, though less perva-
sive than in the prior situation, "have the tendency to undermine majority
strength and impede the election processes."4 In this situation, the Court
adopted the following test:
If the Board finds that the possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of
ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional remedies, though
present, is slight and that employee sentiment once expressed through cards would,
on balance, be better protected by a bargaining order, then such an order should
issue. 46
Finally, the Court noted that there exists the possibility of "a third
category of minor or less extensive unfair labor practices, which, because
of their minimal impact on the election machinery, will not sustain a
bargaining order."4
It is important to emphasize at this point that neither the Court4" nor
claim of misrepresentation based upon one or more of the following statements having been
made to ninety-seven of the one hundred twenty-two card signers: "[Tihat the card would
be used to get an election . . . that [the employee] had the right to vote either way, even
though he signed the card . . . that the card would be kept secret and not shown to anybody
except to the Board in order to get an election." Id. at 584-85 n.5. The trial examiner con-
cluded "that these statements, singly or jointly, do not foreclose use of the cards for the
purpose designated on their face." Id. at 585 n.5.
42. 395 U.S. at 610.
43. Id. at 612 (footnote omitted).
44. Id. at 613.
45. Id. at 614.
46. Id. at 614-15.
47. Id. at 615.
48. See id. at 608.
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the Board 9 have adopted a per se rule with respect to bargaining orders.
In other words, the totality of each situation must be examined in light
of the above rule to determine the propriety of a bargaining order. The
presence of any particular unfair labor practice will not, of itself, require
a bargaining order. Such an order will be appropriate only when "the pos-
sibility... of ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) . .. is slight ... ."
Thus, Gissel establishes a fair, reasonable test by which the propriety of
a bargaining order may, in each particular case, be measured. The dif-
ficulty in applying the Gissel test, however, is in determining the fine line
between the "less extraordinary cases" in the Court's second category
and the "minor or less extensive unfair labor practices" of the third cat-
egory.
With respect to this distinction between the second and third categories,
it is important to note that the Court, in dictum, stated that a limited
interrogation of employees, even if violative of the Act, "might not be
serious enough to call for a bargaining order."'"
49. See Aaron Brothers Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966).
50. 395 U.S. at 614.
51. Id. at 609, citing Aaron Brothers Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966) and Hammond &
Irving, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 1071 (1965). NLRB v. Marsellus Vault & Sales, Inc., 431 F.2d 933
(2d Cir. 1970), fel Croan Motors, Inc. v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1963) and NTLRB
v. OA. Fuller Super Mkts., Inc., 374 F.2d 197 (Sth Cir. 1967), are cases which involved
interrogations. In each of these cases, the interrogation was held not to have violated § 8(a)
(1) of the Act.
In Marsellus Vault, a supervisor asked one employee, "'How come you went for outside
help?'", and another, "'. . . if you had any problems, why didn't you come to me with
them?"' 431 F.2d at 936. The court took note of the fact that the questions were asked at the
employee's work stations and not in the employer's office. The court found that the remarks
themselves did not constitute unfair labor practices, but added that they "do add significance
to the later unfair labor practices." Id. at 937.
In Mel Croan, a supervisor informed of the union activity asked two employees "'who
started it and how it got started.'" 395 F.2d at 155. The court found these questions to have
been "an instinctive reaction to a surprise confrontation" and not a coercive interrogation
in violation of the Act. In so finding, the court relied upon the following facts: There was
no background of employer hostility to union activity; the interrogation did not take place
in an atmosphere of unnatural formality; and the supervisor was not seeking information upon
which to base reprisals. Id. at 156.
In Fuller Super Markets, on the day after the store manager learned that various em-
ployees had signed authorization cards, the following conversation took place between the
manager and one of the employees:
Manager: "I see you signed the card, the Union card."
Employee: "Yes sir."
Manager: "I wonder who started it?" 374 F.2d at 203.
The court found no background of employer discrimination, that the circumstances were not
such as would reasonably induce a fear of reprisal, and that there was no established pattern
of employee interrogation. Consequently, the court found that the interrogation did not
constitute an unfair labor practice.
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4. Application of the Court's Decision to the Cases
Pending Before It
In affirming the circuit court's enforcement of the Board order in Sin-
clair, the Gissel Court found the case to be within the first category of
"exceptional" or "outrageous" cases. This holding was based upon the
Board's finding that "the employer's threats of reprisal were so coercive
that, even in the absence of a § 8(a) (5) violation, a bargaining order
would have been necessary to repair the unlawful effect of those threats.""2
In the three cases appealed from the Fourth Circuit, the Court indi-
cated that it was probably implicit in the Board orders that the possibility
of a fair election or rerun was slight. Nevertheless, since the Board
couched its findings in terms of a "good faith doubt," the Court remanded
the case to the Board for proper findings."
On remand,54 the Board found the unfair labor practices in each of
these cases to be sufficient to warrant a bargaining order. In Gissel and
Heck's, the interference was found to be so flagrant and coercive in na-
ture as to warrant the imposition of a bargaining order "even in the
absence of a Section 8(a) (5) violation." 5 In General Steel, on the other
hand, the Board merely found it unlikely that the lingering effects of the
unlawful conduct would be neutralized by conventional remedies.50
D. Administration of the Gissel Rules
The Gissel Court not only established definite guidelines for determin-
ing the appropriateness of a bargaining order in each case, but also firmly
established the importance and significance of the Board's initial deter-
mination of the appropriate remedy. The Court noted that:
In fashioning its remedies under the broad provisions of § 10(c) of the Act .
the Board draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise all its own, and its choice of
remedy must therefore be given special respect by reviewing courts. 7
In light of this admonition, absent a showing of clear abuse of discre-
tion, the courts of appeal will not set aside a bargaining order. Conse-
quently, an extensive review of not only the circuit court cases interpreting
52. 395 U.S. at 615 (footnote omitted). In this respect, it is important to note that under
the Bernel Foam Doctrine [Bernel Foam Prods. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964)], "there is
nothing inconsistent in the Union's filing an election petition and thereby agreeing that a
question of representation exists, and then filing a refusal-to-bargain charge after the elec-
tion is lost because of the employer's unfair labor practices." 395 U.S. at 615 n.34.
53. 395 U.S. at 616.
54. Heck's, Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 430 (1969); General Steel Prods., Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 56
(1969) ; Gissel Packing Co., 180 N.L.R.B. 54 (1969).
55. Heck's, Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 430 (1969); Gissel Packing Co., 180 N.L.R.B. 54, 55 (1969).
56. 157 N.L.R.B. 636 (1966).
57. 395 U.S. at 612 n.32.
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Gissel but also the Board determinations following Gissel is essential in
order to determine the circumstances under which an employer will be
ordered to bargain with the union.
II. CASES AND BOARD DECISIONS FOLLOWING Gissel
In order to determine the parameters of the Gissel doctrine and to fully
understand its application, it will be necessary to review the various cases
and Board decisions following Gissel. In particular, a careful examination
of the unfair labor practice charges sustained in those cases is essential.
At the outset, it is important to keep in mind the various sections of
the NLRA with which the courts and the Board are dealing. Before a
bargaining order may be issued, a violation of § 8(a) (5) (refusal to bar-
gain) must be found.5" Following Gissel, this violation may be found to
spring from a violation of either § 8(a) (1) (interference with § 7 rights)
or § 8(a) (3) (discriminatory discharge) or both. Occasionally, there will
be found a violation of § 8(a) (2) (domination), but this will always be
compounded by at least a § 8(a) (1) violation.
The background of each of the post-Gissel cases generally fails within
a simple pattern. The union seeks representational status through the
solicitation of authorization cards. When cards have been signed by a
majority of employees within the unit, the union demands recognition.
Upon learning of the union activity, the employer generally engages in
a vigorous anti-union campaign and commits various unfair labor prac-
tices as a result. There may or may not be an election. The union files
charges, the NLRB General Counsel issues a complaint, and a trial ex-
aminer takes evidence from both sides. The trial examiner, in his report
to the Board, makes findings of fact and law and recommends disposition
of the proceeding in the manner he deems appropriate. The Board is, of
course, free to accept or reject the trial examiner's findings and recom-
mendations in its decision.
A close examination of the post-Gissel cases and Board decisions should
58. Some disagreement has arisen as to the theory upon which a bargaining order is
issued. Members Fanning and Brown indicate that they consider the § 8(a)(5) violation to
be inherent in the § 8(a) (1) violation, without even the necessity of having to find a refusal
to bargain. United Packing Co., 187 N.L.R.B. No. 132 (Jan. 15, 1971), 1971 CCH NLRB
Dec. f 22,654. Chairman Miller, on the other hand, feels that the Board should differentiate
between bargaining orders based on § 8(a) (1) violations and those based on § 8(a) (5) viola-
tions. United Packing Co., 1971 CCH NLRB Dec. f1 22,654, at 29,296-97 (concurring opinion).
The rationale behind Miller's argument is that a finding of a § 8(a)(5) violation arising
out of a § 8(a)(1) violation merely serves to confuse. Further, he considers a § 8(a)(1)
violation, standing alone, to be sufficient basis for issuing a bargaining order. This disagree-
ment need not detain us here as it is more a problem of semantics than anything else. This
is particularly so since the result under either theory is the same, a bargaining order. See
also F.W. Woolworth Co., 188 N.L.R.B. No. 119 (Mar. 11, 1971), 1971 CCH NLRB Dec.
gf 22,816.
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reveal the answers to at least two important questions: First, has the
pre-Gissel standard actually been abandoned and the Gissel doctrine put
into effect? Second, what factors are considered to be controlling in the
determination of whether or not a bargaining order should issue?
A. Decisions Pending Before the Courts
at the Time Gissel Was Decided
As previously noted, Gissel changed the inquiry for determining whether
or not a bargaining order should issue. At the time Gissel was decided,
many Board decisions were pending before the courts on actions for en-
forcement of bargaining orders."0 These decisions were, of course, all de-
cided under the Joy Silk doctrine. Consequently, with the exception of
but a few, these cases were remanded to the Board for further findings
in light of Gissel.
1. The Exceptions
Several courts relied upon the Supreme Court's disposition of Sinclair,
(one of the Gissel cases) as authority for the enforcement of the pre-
Gissel bargaining orders in these cases. Consequently, it may be inferred
that the respective courts deemed these cases to fall within the first Gissel
category of "outrageous" and "pervasive" unfair labor practices justify-
ing a bargaining order even without an unlawful refusal to bargain. How-
ever, it must be noted that there was a showing of majority status in
these cases.
Typical of these cases is NLRB v. Wylie Manufacturing Co.10 The
union in Wylie demanded recognition based upon thirty authorization
cards from a unit of thirty-six employees. The employer refused to recog-
nize the union and won the ensuing election by a single vote, 18-17.
Following a pre-Gissel hearing,"' the Board found that a plant manager
and a foreman had systematically interrogated six employees, threatened
economic reprisals 2 in the event of a union victory, and promised bene-
fits if the union were defeated. The court held that, in light of these find-
ings, the Board did not abuse its discretion in granting a bargaining order,
and, citing Sinclair, enforced the Board's decision. 3
Likewise, in Local 880, Retail Store Employees v. NLRB," the court
59. § 10(e) of the NLRA empowers the Board to petition the court of appeals for en-
forcement of its orders. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970). § 10(f) of the Act permits an aggrieved
party to seek review of a final order of the Board in the court of appeals. Id. § 160(f).
60. 417 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
61. 162 N.L.R.B. 799 (1967).
62. The reprisals included fewer hours of work, discharge, loss of overtime, no raises,
and plant relocation.
63. 417 F.2d at 196.
64. 419 F.2d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also NLRB v. L.B. Foster Co., 418 F.2d 1 (9th
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cited Sinclair in enforcing the Board's bargaining order.65 The § 8(a) (1)
and § 8(a)(3) violations involved in this case included unlawful inter-
rogations, discriminatory reprisals, a bonus, reduction of one employee's
hours and discharge of another employee.
In each of these cases which the court presumably found to involve
"extreme" unfair labor practices, the employer's anti-union campaign was
both extreme and compounded by multiple instances of unfair labor prac-
tices. This is especially clear in Retail Store Employees, where the em-
ployer violated both § 8(a) (1) and § 8(a) (3) of the Act.
2. Remanded Cases
A reading of the cases remanded to the Board to be reconsidered in
light of Gissel reveals two significant facts:
a) in not one of these cases did the Board determine that a bargaining
order issued under the Joy Silk doctrine was inappropriate under the Gissel
doctrine;
b) in every case, the Board appears to have merely rephrased its opin-
ion, replacing the Joy Silk language with Gissel language.6
In reaffirming the initial bargaining order, the Board would reiterate
its former unfair labor practice findings and couch its decision in one or
more of the following Gissel phrases: Traditional remedies could not en-
sure a fair rerun;6 7 unfair labor practices establish the likelihood of their
recurrence; 6 a fair election rerun is unlikely;" or the unfair labor prac-
tices were so coercive and pervasive as to destroy utterly the conditions
necessary for a free election.7"
A majority of these cases, however, involved extensive unfair labor
practices, generally involving violations of both § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a) (3).
In some cases, there were, in addition, violations of § 8(a) (2). 71
Typically, these cases involved surveillance of employees, threats of
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970), where the court compared in detail the actual
language of the Board decision to the language used by the Board in Sinclair. In that caw,
the employer violated § 8(a) (1) by coercively interrogating employees, threatening to dis-
charge the employees and close the plant and attempting to solicit the employees to withdraw
their union cards.
65. 419 F.2d at 336.
66. These are, of course, two of the primary areas of concern asserted by the court in
General Stencils and American Cable. See text accompanying notes 110-26 infra.
67. See, e.g., A.J. Krajewski Mfg. Co., 180 N.L.R.B. 1071 (1970).
68. See, e.g., Henry Colder Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 320 (1970).
69. See, e.g., American Art Indus., Inc., 179 NJL.RJ. 907, enforced, 415 F.2d 1223 (Sth
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970).
70. See, e.g., J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 5 (1967), enforced, 415 F2d 1133
(6th Cir. 1969).
71. See Henry Colder Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 320 (1970); Mechanical Specialties Co, 179
N.L.R.B. 676 (1969).
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discharge, discharges or layoffs and promises of benefit should the union
lose.
In Local 347, Food Store Employees v. NLRB,72 the employer had
engaged in coercive interrogation of the employees, created an impression
of surveillance, adopted an unlawful no-solicitation rule, transferred one
employee and discharged three others. Following a demand for recogni-
tion based upon cards from twenty-three of forty-one employees and the
employer's refusal, the Board found violations of §§ 8(a)(1), (3) and
(5) and ordered the employer to bargain with the union upon request.78
The Board, however, does not limit its bargaining orders to situations
involving violations of multiple sections of the Act. In Krystyniak v.
NLRB,7 4 the employer violated only § 8(a) (1). The Board, nevertheless,
found the employer's conduct to be so egregious that it held a bargain-
ig order would be appropriate even absent a refusal to bargain."
A number of cases remanded to the Board were subsequently enforced
when they later appeared before the court. One such case, NLRB v.
American Art Industries, Inc.,78 involved violations of §§ 8(a)(1), (3)
and (4) of the Act. The §§ 8(a)(1) and (3) violations involved the
usual interrogation, threats, promises and discharges. The § 8 (a) (4) vio-
lation involved the discharge of four employees who had testified at an
NLRB hearing. The Board, considering the case on remand, found that
the coercive effects of the unfair labor practices could not be eliminated
by traditional remedies and held that:
[T]he [employer's] extensive violations of Section 8(a) (3) and (1) contemporaneously
with its refusal to bargain, and in conjunction with [its] subsequent 8(a)(4) viola-
tions, demonstrate the likelihood of the recurrence of unfair labor practices in the
future, and render any traditional remedy inadequate assurance of a fair election....
Therefore, we find that the bargaining order previously issued to remedy the [em-
72. 418 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir.), on remand, 179 N.L.R.B. 778 (1969).
73. See also NLRB v. S.E. Nichols-Dover, Inc., 414 F.2d 561 (3d Cir.), on remand,
179 N.L.R.B. 249 (1969); A.J. Krajewski Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 413 F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1969),
on remand, 180 N.L.R.B. 1071, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
74. 415 F.2d 125 (3d Cir.), on remand, 179 N.L.R.B. 831 (1969). Other cases In
which a bargaining order has been issued to rectify violations of § 8(a)(1) only Include:
NLRB v. Easton Packing Co., 416 F.2d 256 (3d Cir. 1969), on remand, 180 N.L.R.B. 1092
(1970), aff'd, 437 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Hart Beverage Co., 414 F.2d 618 (8th
Cir. 1969), on remand, 185 N.L.R.B. No. 111 (Sept. 29, 1970), 1970 CCH NLRB Dec.
f 22,335, rev'd, 445 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1971).
75. The employer coercively interrogated the employees, promised benefits, threatened
reprisals and discharges, granted a wage increase and threatened to close the shop.
76. 179 N.L.R.B. 907, enforced, 415 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
990 (1970). See also NLRB v. Mink-Dayton, Inc., 416 F.2d 327 (6th Cir. 1969), on remand,
181 N.L.R.B. 243, enforced, 426 F.2d 255 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970);
Atlas Engine Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 396 F.2d 775 (6th Cir. 1968), on remand, 181 N.L.R.B.
52, aff'd, 435 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 909 (1971).
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ployer's] unfair labor practices is appropriate to remedy its violations of Section
8(a)(5) as well as Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act. 71
It is obvious from these cases that Gissel had no immediate effect upon
the issuance of bargaining orders. The Board's reconsideration of the cases
in light of Gissel consisted merely in rephrasing the decisions using Gissel
language. For the most part, the courts, recognizing the Board's expertise
in fashioning remedies, merely accepted the rephrased remand decisions
and enforced the bargaining orders.
B. Post-Gissel Board Proceedings in Which a Bargaining
Order Was Not Issued
The number of cases in which the Board has determined unfair labor
practices to be of the minor or less extensive type is miniscule in com-
parison with the number of cases in which the Board has issued bargain-
ing orders. This, in itself, indicates that the Board either does not consider
a bargaining order to be a drastic remedy or it places a very restrictive
interpretation upon the category of less extensive unfair labor practices
not requiring a bargaining order, or both. An examination of these cases
will be helpful, therefore, in determining what the Board considers to be
the spectrum in which the Gissel doctrine is to be applied.
In a recent case before the Board, Clover Industries Division of GTI
Corp.,78 the union lost an election by a vote of thirty-eight to thirty after
demanding recognition based on some fifty cards. During the organization
period, a foreman approached an employee, a good friend, and jokingly
said that the company had authorization cards and that some of the em-
ployees were going to ask for them back. On another occasion, a foreman
told two employees not to wear union buttons as they might interfere with
the operation of their presses and prove to be hazardous. In addition to
these conversations, the work of four part-time employees was reduced.
The trial examiner found that the conversations were not coercive in ef-
fect and that the reduction of work, despite the fact that business picked
up shortly thereafter, was not prompted by the employees' union senti-
ment. Consequently, the trial examiner concluded that "there were no
extensive practices justifying a bargaining order. Since there were no
Section 8(a) (1) and (3) violations,. . . there was no unlawful refusal to
bargain."79 The Board adopted the trial examiner's findings and recom-
mendations holding that "there was no conduct on which a bargaining
order could have been predicated."80
77. 179 N.L.R.B. at 907-08.
78. 188 NL.R.B. No. 36 (Jan. 29, 1971), 1971 CCH NLRB Dec. f 22,709.
79. 1971 CCH NLRB Dec. 11 22,709, at 29,378.
80. Id. In C.E. Glass, Div. of Combustion Eng'r, Inc., 189 N.LR.B. No. 74 (Mar. 31,
1972]
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In a similar case, Oxford Pickles, Division of John E. Cain Co.,"1 a
divided Board found an employer's letters to his employees to be non-
coercive and refused to issue a bargaining order. Included in those let-
ters were such statements as:
Question: If the Union is voted in, isn't the Company forced by law to keep its plant
in South Deerfield?
Answer: Absolutely not. If a Union in this plant put us in a position of not being
able to compete in the sale of pickles, we have every legal right to move
where costs would permit us to compete with other plants.
The Company is free to hire permanent replacements for the strikers so that it can
continue to operate. This means that after the strike is over, you may no longer
have a job.82
The employer noted in the letter that it was prohibited from making
pre-election promises to its employees, and added that the underlying rea-
son for this was the Board's recognition that the employer "'does have
the power to make good its promises and the Union does not.' "
Olin Conductors, Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp.,4 presents an inter-
esting situation in which the trial examiner recommended a bargaining
order, but the Board found one to be unnecessary. In this case, the union
obtained cards from sixty-nine of the eighty-three employees in the unit.
The employer refused to recognize the union and defeated the union by
an eighty-one to thirty-four vote in the election.
During the organizational campaign, the employer called a series of
meetings to discuss the employees' complaints. These complaints, all minor
in nature (such as a request for a water cooler), were subsequently rec-
tified. The employer also stressed the fact that all benefits presently en-
joyed by the employees would be subject to negotiation should the union
be elected. On several occasions, the employer questioned the employees
as to their support for the union.
The union complained of various unfair labor practices and raised ob-
jections to the election. The trial examiner found that the employer had
violated §§ 8(a) (1) and (5) of the Act and that, under the standards set
forth in Gissel, a bargaining order was appropriate.
The Board adopted the trial examiner's findings with the exception of
the § 8(a)(5) violation and held that "[t]he 8(a)(1) violations are
1971), 1971 CCH NLRB Dec. ff 22,889, the Board, Member Brown dissenting, found an
employer's "speech" distributed to the employees along with their paychecks to be non-
coercive.
81. 190 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (April 26, 1971), 1971 CCH NLRB Dec. f1 22,981.
82. BNA, Daily Lab. Rep. A-6, at A-? (Apr. 30, 1971).
83. Id. at A-8.
84. 185 N.L.R.B. No. 56 (Aug. 27, 1970), 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. II 22,290.
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neither so extensive in nature nor so pervasive in character as to preclude
the holding of a fair rerun election.""9
Sinclair & Rush, Inc.,8" involved unfair labor practice charges which
were somewhat more grievous than those in the prior cases. The union
demanded recognition based upon cards from twenty-four of the forty
employees in the unit. The employer refused, suggesting that an election
would be appropriate. During the organizational campaign, the employer
engaged in day-to-day conversations with the employees, questioned them
about their union sympathies and promised them benefits if the union
were rejected. In addition, after the election, the employer posted a notice
stating that as a matter of law he was "prevented from improving the
wages, benefits or other terms and conditions of employment until such
time as" 7 the objections filed by the union were resolved. This was de-
termined by the Board to be a misrepresentation of the applicable law.
The Board found that the above practices violated § 8(a)(1) but
nevertheless adopted the trial examiner's finding that "[t]he holding of
a fair election was not necessarily rendered impossible.""8 It should be
noted here that the Board determined that a fair election was possible
despite the presence of compound § 8(a) (1) violations (interrogations,
promises of benefits and misrepresentation of the applicable law).
In Carpenter Lithographing & Printing Co.,"" the Board found that a
fair election could be held despite the fact that an employee had been laid
off for suspected union activity. This § 8(a) (1) and (3) violation was,
however, tempered by the fact that the employee was not active in the
employer's plant and was on sick leave at the time of the layoff. Never-
theless, it indicates that the Board will, in appropriate circumstances, with-
hold a bargaining order despite a § 8(a) (3) violation.
In Central Soya of Canton, Inc.,0 the Board, in an in-depth opinion,
set forth certain factors which it said it would consider in mitigation of
various unfair labor practices. The Board found that the following con-
duct violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (3): A supervisor told the employees to
remove union buttons and those refusing were told to leave the produc-
tion line; the employer adopted a no-solicitation rule which the Board
found to be overly broad; nine employees were suspended or laid off for
wearing union badges. The Board took into consideration, however, the
fact that in each of these instances the employer took immediate steps to
85. 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. ff 22,290, at 28,745.
86. 185 N.L..JB. No. 9 (.Aug. 21, 1970), 1970 CCI NLRB Dec. ff 22,234.
87. 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. ff 22,234, at 28,642.
88. Id. at 28,641.
89. 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. 9 21,911.
90. 180 NLYL.B. 546, enforced, 433 F.2d 347 (Sth Cir. 1970).
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rectify his unlawful activity. The badge prohibition and no-solicitation
rule were rescinded the next day and the suspended employees were re-
instated and paid for the time missed.
The Board, in deciding that a fair election rerun could be held, found
the following factors to be controlling:
a) The relatively minor nature and limited extent of the unfair labor
practices;
b) The erasure of the coercive effects therefrom and the unlikelihood
of recurrence; and
c) The fact that there was no independent indication that a coercion-
free rerun could not be held."
In Blade-Tribune Publishing Co.,92 the employer suggested to three of
the twenty-four employees in the unit that a rejection of the union would
be to their benefit. He also made a change in the work schedule of one
union supporter. The Board found that this conduct constituted the minor,
less extensive type of unfair labor practice that did not justify a bargain-
ing order.
Stoutco, Inc.,93 involved a slightly different situation than the usual pat-
tern. In this case, the union did not represent a majority of the employees
at the time it petitioned for an election. 4 Throughout the organizational
campaign, the employer threatened to withdraw existing benefits if the
union were elected, interrogated employees with regard to their union ac-
tivities, threatened to discharge employees and close the plant, and, fi-
nally, threatened to impose more work on the employees. The Board
ordered a new election, holding: "[W]e do not believe that, in all the
circumstances of this case, the unfair labor practices were of such a nature
as to warrant imposition of a bargaining order."9
Reviewing these cases as a whole, the Board appears to be stating that
it will not issue a bargaining order when: a) the unfair labor practices
are of an extremely minor or non-coercive nature; b) there are substan-
tial mitigating factors which indicate that a fair election or rerun may be
possible; or c) where the union never had a majority and the unfair labor
practices were not "extreme" and "pervasive."
C. Post-Gissel Bargaining Orders
The vast majority of proceedings in which the Board finds the employer
to have engaged in unfair labor practices do result in the issuance of a
91. 180 N.L.R.B. at 547.
92. 180 N.L.R.B. 432 (1969).
93. 180 N..R.B. 178 (1969).
94. Consequently, in order to issue a bargaining order under Gissel, the Board would
have to find the case to be within the first category of unfair labor practices, i.e., involving
"outrageous" conduct. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
95. 180 N.LR.B, at 179.
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bargaining order. 6 Likewise, the overwhelming majority of Board-issued
bargaining orders which are brought before the courts for enforcement
are upheld, often without opinion.17
96. Quaker Bakery Mach. Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 141 (Aug. 21, 1972), 1972 CCH NLRB
Dec. fI 24,534; Restaurant Associates Indus., Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 172 (Jan. 17, 1972),
1972 CCH NLRB Dec. 13 23,797; M.J. Pirolli & Sons, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (Nov. 18,
1971), 1972 CCH NLRB Dec. 13 23,695; Dodson's Mkt., Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. No. 22 (Nov. 16,
1971), 1972 CCH NLRB Dec. ff 23,655; Short Stop, Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. No. 107 (Oct.
14, 1971), 1971 CCH NLRB Dec. 13 23,555; Almaden Volkswagen, 193 N.L.R.B. No. 110
(Oct. 13, 1971), 1971 CCH NLRB Dec. 1 23,557; Midwest Hanger Co., 193 N.L.R.B.
No. 85 (Oct. 8, 1971), 1971 CCH NLRB Dec. 1 23,542; American Leather & Suede
Cleaners, Inc., 189 N.L.R.B. No. 95 (April 8, 1971), 1971 CCH NLRB Dec. E3 22,917;
Escondido Ready-Mix Concrete, Inc., 189 N.L.R.B. No. 69 (March 30, 1971), 1971 CCH
NLRB Dec. 13 22,890, aff'd, 78 LRRM 2221 (9th Cir. 1971); Ship Shape Maint. Co., 189
N.L.R.B. No. 58 (March 29, 1971), 1971 CCH NLRB Dec. 13 22,879; George J. Roberts &
Sons, Inc, 188 N.L.R.B. No. 51 (Feb. 9, 1971), 1971 CCH NLRB Dec. t3 22,744, modified,
451 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1971); Dalf Corp., 188 N.L.R.B. No. 57 (Feb. 2, 1971), 1971 CCH
NLRB Dec. 1 22,725; Seibert Distrib. Co., 187 N.L.R.B. No. 108 (Jan. 7, 1971), 1971 CCH
NLRB Dec. 13 22,625; Weisman's Furniture & Appliances, Inc., 187 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (Jan.
4, 1971), 1971 CCH NLRB Dec. 13 22,612, aff'd, 455 F.2d 1406 (2d Cir. 1972); Sayers Print-
ing Co., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 120 (Oct. 1, 1970), 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. 13 22,347, modified,
453 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1971); Hickman Garment Co., 184 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (Aug. 11, 1970),
1970 CCH N LRB Dec. 13 22,212, aff'd, 437 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1971); C & M Sports-
wear Mfg. Corp., 183 N.L.R.B. No. 29 (June 10, 1970), 1970 CCH NLRB Dc. 5 22,003;
Dawson Metal Prods., Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. No. 25 (June 10, 1970), 1970 CCH NLRB Dec.
U 21,990, rev'd, 450 F.2d 47 (1971); Mr. Wicke, Ltd., 182 N.L.R.B. 38 (1970); 2520
Madison Corp., 181 N.L.R.B. 910 (1970); Schuckman Press, Inc., 181 N.L.R.B. 158 (1970);
Davis Wholesale Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 1, 2 (1970); Louisburg Sportswear Co., 180 N.L.R.B.
739 (1970), modified, 68 LC 13 12,599 (4th Cir. 1972); Vars Buick Corp., 180 N.L.R.B. 626
(1970); C & G Elec., Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 427 (1969); Chris Christou Co., 180 N.L.R.B. 418
(1969); W.T. Grant Co., 180 N.L.R.B. 400 (1969); Howard Mfg. Co., 180 N.L.R.B. 220
(1969), enforced, 436 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 930 (1971); Interstate
Equip. Co., Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. 621 (1969); Stayer's Johnsonville Mleats, Inc., 179 N.L.R.B.
887 (1969); Dayton Town & Country Furniture Shop, Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. 847 (1969); Irving
N. Rothkin, 179 N.L.R.B. 832 (1969), aff'd, 434 F.2d 1051 (6th Cir. 1970); U-Tote M, Inc.,
179 N.L.R.B. 829 (1969), aft'd, 80 LRRM 2904 (4th Cir. 1972); Kostel Corp., 179 N.L.LB.
730 (1969), supplementing 172 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (Aug. 14, 1968), 1968-2 CCH NLRB Dec.
13 20,117; R.D. Cortina Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 701 (1969), modified, 440 F.d 347 (7th Cir.
1971); Horace Simmons, 179 N.L.R.B. 641 (1969); Hancock Fabric Outlet, Inc., 179
N.L.R.B. 639 (1969), enforced without opinion, 438 F2d 886 (5th Cir. 1971); Welcome-
American Fertilizer Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 217 (1969), rev'd, 443 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1971); Zolan
Sales Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. 238 (1969); Nat Harrison Associates, Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. 113 (1969);
George A. Angle, 176 N.L.R.B. No. 115 (June 25, 1969), 1969 CCH NLRB Dec. U 21,022;
Davis Transp., Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. 557 (1968), on remand, 180 N.L.R.B. 966, enforced, 433
F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1970).
97. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 514 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830
(1971); NLRB v. Renner Plumbing, Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 437 F.2d 893 (4th
Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Diamond Standard Fuel Corp., 437 F.2d 1163 (Ist Cir. 1971) (per
curiam); NLRB v. Coast Delivery Serv., Inc, 437 Fad 264 (9th Cir. 1971); NLRB v.
Arrow Specialties, Inc., 437 F.2d 522 (8th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Gerbes Super M-ts., Inc.,
436 F.2d 19 (8th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Brown Specialty Co., 436 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1971);
FORDIJAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41
From the examination of the cases up to this point, it has become clear
that employers generally follow the same patterns in committing unfair
labor practices. Because the cases are so similar, an attempt to develop
the facts of each case would be unnecessarily repetitious. Nearly every
case involves similar findings of coercive interrogation, promises of benefit,
discharges, threats of reprisals, threats of plant relocation, and so forth."
The differences are generally in the degree of the offense.
In addition to cases involving usual unfair labor practice charges, bar-
gaining orders have been issued in cases involving: post-election unfair
labor practices which compounded the unlawful pre-election activity, 9
NLRB v. Clay City Beverages, Inc., 434 F.2d 1315 (6th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Texaco,
Inc. v. NLRB, 436 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Jerome T. Kane, 435 F.2d 1203
(4th Cir. 1970); Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 432 F.2d 1341 (D.C. 1970);
NLRB v. Kingwood Mining Co., 435 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Ayer Lar
Sanitarium, 436 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1970); United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 1005
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Local 153, ILGWU v. NLRB, 64 L.C. II 11,261 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per
curiam); NLRB v. Intl Metal Specialties, Inc., 433 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 907 (1971); NLRB v. V & H Indus., Inc., 433 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curlam);
NLRB v. Stanley Air Tools, 432 F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 908 (1971); Thrift Drug Co. v. NLRB, 433 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1970); Byrne Dairy,
Inc. v. NLRB, 431 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam); NLRB v. Lou De Young's Mkt.
Basket, Inc., 430 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1970); G.P.D., Inc. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 963 (6th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); NLRB v. Falls Dodge, Inc., 431 F.2d 33 (6th
Cir.); Snyder Tank Corp. v. NLRB, 428 F.2d 1348 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971); Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 763 (8th Cir.
1970) (per curiam), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 879 (1970); NLRB v. Production Indus., Inc.,
425 F.2d 1206 (6th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB,
419 F.2d 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 988 (1970); NLRB v.
Cedar Hills Theatres, Inc., 417 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam); ILGWU v. NLRB,
414 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 951 (1970); Amal-
gamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 417 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1015 (1970); Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 420 F.2d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(per curiam).
98. A case which deviates slightly from the usual pattern is NLRB v. Li'l Gen-
eral Stores, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. No. 94 (Mar. 28, 1968), 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. I1 22,304,
enforced, 422 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1970), on remand, 188 N.L.R.B. No. 117 (Mar. 5, 1971),
1971 CCH NLRB Dec. 1 22,802. The union solicited nineteen cards from the twenty-three-
man unit. Without making a prior demand for recognition, the union petitioned for an
election which it subsequently lost by a vote of 16-8. The Board found the usual § 8(a) (1)
and (3) violations and issued a bargaining order. The court remanded the case to the
Board for a determination of whether or not the employer had knowledge of the union
majority. Without this knowledge, apparently, the union would not be entitled to the
bargaining order despite the unfair labor practices. On remand, however, the Board found
that the employer had the requisite knowledge and ordered him to bargain with the union
upon request.
99. United Packing Co., 187 N.L.R.B. No. 132 (Jan. 15, 1971), 1971 CCH NLRB Dec.
fI 22,654; see NLRB v. UAW, 432 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1970).
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the discharge of employees because of their union sympathies, 00 a poll
of the employee's views on unionization taken without a secret ballot
or assurances against reprisals,101 the circulation of a petition among the
employees by the employer to authorize the withdrawal of union applica-
tions,10 2 supporting a rival union,103 and the discharge of employees
engaged in an unfair labor practice strike.0
Important to this discussion are the factors which will not preclude the
issuance of a bargaining order.'05 The size of the appropriate unit, for
example, will not be considered by the Board. Bargaining orders have
been issued for units comprised of as few as two employees' 0 and as
many as five hundred.0 7 Likewise, so long as the union has cards from a
majority of employees in the unit, the size of that majority will not affect
the outcome. 08 Nor will the size of the employer's election victory be
given any weight by the Board. 09
100. Transport, Inc., 181 N.L.R.B. 478 (1970), enforced, 453 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971).
101. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 188 N.L.R.B. No. 91 (Feb. 19, 1971), 1971 CCH NLRB
Dec. 1 22,766.
102. Ace-Alkire Freight Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 431 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1970).
103. Brescome Distribs. Corp., 179 N.L.R.B. 787 (1969), enforced, 452 F2d 1312 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
104. Transport, Inc., 181 N.L.R.B. 478 (1970), enforced, 453 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971).
105. One factor which has caused considerable disagreement is the weight which should
be given to the passage of time and employee turnover. The court remanded NLRB v.
American Cable Systems, Inc., 427 F.2d 446 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970),
to the Board on this very point. Likewise, the court in NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc.,
438 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1971) "suggested" that the Board consider evidence on this point in
its reconsideration of the propriety of a bargaining order. On the other hand, in a recent
case, New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1971), the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the Board's refusal to reopen the record to consider these factors. The court, in
Alaska Development, specifically refused to follow American Cable and held that "a bargain-
ing order may be enforced 'in spite of substantial changes in the situation occurring after
the election." Id. at 493 (citation omitted). The position taken by the Board on this issue
is quite clear-an employer should not be permitted to profit from his wrongdoing. Thus, the
Board will issue a bargaining order regardless of the changed circumstances and, depending
upon the circuit in which the case arises, the court may or may not remand on this issue.
106. Central Distrib. Co., 187 N.L.R.B. No. 121 (Jan. 19, 1971), 1971 CCH NLRB Dec.
1 22,656.
107. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 420 F.2d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
108. Essex Wire Corp., 188 N.L.R.B. No. 59 (Feb. 5, 1971), 1971 CCH NLRB Dec.
1 22,738 (cards from 189 out of 345 employees). But see Chairman Miller's dissenting opin-
ion in which he argues that the slender majority coupled with the fact that a few cards
were disallowed due to misrepresentations is sufficient basis to deny the bargaining order.
1971 CCH NLRB Dec. ff 22,738, at 29,415.
109. In NLRB v. Li'l General Stores, Inc., 422 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1970), the union
lost by a 16-8 vote. In Howard Mfg. Co., 180 N.L.R.B. 220 (1969), enforced, 436 F2d
581 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 930 (1971), the union lost by a vote of 75-57. In
J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 514 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 US. 830 (1971), the
union lost by a vote of 198-110.
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D. Post-Gissel Court Decisions Which Have
Not Enforced Bargaining Orders
The vast majority of circuit court decisions following the appeal of
Board-issued bargaining orders merely affirm the Board's findings and,
often without opinion, enforce the order. In all but a limited number of
cases, the courts have merely given lip service to the appropriate lan-
guage from Gissel. Nevertheless, in a few cases, courts have refused to
enforce the Board's bargaining order, and have instead engaged in a
searching, critical analysis of the Board's application of the Gissel doc-
trine. For the most part, these courts have found fault with that applica-
tion. These decisions are the subject of this subsection.
An analysis of the Board's post-Gissel policy was made in the Second
Circuit by Chief Judge Friendly in NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc."' In
1961 and again in 1966, attempts to unionize General Stencils had failed
as the union, in each instance, lost a Board-conducted election. A third
attempt, beginning in 1967, led to the instant proceeding. The union,
having solicited authorization cards from twenty-four employees in a
union of thirty-two, demanded recognition. The employer refused, de-
manding another election. The union representative, conceding that the
union could not win an election, declared that there would be no election
since the union was filing unfair labor practices charges, including a refusal
to bargain charge, against the employer.
The trial examiner, acting under pre-Gissel standards, found the em-
ployer's refusal to recognize the union to have been made in "good faith."
Consequently, he found that, despite the § 8(a) (1) violations, there had
been no violation of § 8(a) (5)."' The Board withheld its decision until
after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Gissel. Based upon
the new rules prescribed by the Supreme Court, the Board found the trial
examiner's § 8(a) (5) determination to be incorrect and ordered the
employer to bargain with the union upon request. The Board found that
the employer had engaged in pervasive unfair labor practices both before
and after the union's demand for recognition, and held that:
[tihese unfair labor practices ... tended to destroy the employees' free choice by
frightening them into withdrawing their allegiance from the Union and were of such
a nature as to have a lingering effect and make a fair or coercion-free election quite
dubious, if not impossible." 2
The unfair labor practices upon which the Board based its decision
included the interrogation of employees as to union activity, threats to
110. 438 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1971).
111. General Stencils, Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. 108 (1969), modified, 438 F.2d 894 (1971).
112. 178 N.L.R.B. at 109.
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enforce a no-smoking rule, to discharge employees for tardiness, to dis-
continue a loan policy, to discontinue free coffee breaks, to lay off em-
ployees and to close the plant.
The court of appeals found a sufficient basis for the Board's determina-
tion that the various threats made by the employer constituted a violation
of § 8(a) (1).113 In particular, the court noted that the threat to close the
plant constituted a clear violation of § 8(a)(1) under the Gissel test.
With respect to these findings, the court enforced the Board's cease-and-
desist order.
With respect to Board findings of unlawful interrogation, on the other
hand, the court refused to enforce the Board's cease-and-desist order.
The various interrogations upon which the Board based its decision
included asking an employee if she were " 'with the Union or with
him' ,,114 (adding that it was up to her whether or not she joined); asking
another employee whether he had signed a card and who had attended a
particular union meeting; and finally, asking a third employee if he had
signed a card, to which he falsely replied in the negative. In the first two
instances, the court found that there was no attempt to subject the em-
ployees to coercion or to intimidate them with inherent threats of reprisal.
In the third case, the court found the interrogation to be an insufficient
basis upon which to base a § 8(a) (1) violation.
Thus, the court was faced with determining the appropriateness of a
bargaining order based only on the employer's various threats of reprisal.
Although mindful of the Board's expertise in fashioning remedies, the
court found that the Board merely discharged its obligation by "'reciting
conclusions by rote without factual explication.' "'I This finding, coupled
with a discussion of seemingly contradictory Board decisions, led the
court to remand for further consideration that portion of the Board order
which dealt with the § 8(a) (5) violation."'
113. The court noted, however, that it "entertain~ed] some doubt whether the Gissel
test applies in all its severity to the discussion of such subjects." 438 F2d at 900.
114. Id. at 898.
115. Id. at 901.
116. The court further indicated that the threats involved in this case would not be a
sufficient basis upon which to issue a bargaining order: "It deserves emphasis that the
Court noted in Gissel.. . that threats to eliminate benefits had been shown to have very
much less effect on rerun elections-and thus presumably on elections-than threats of plant
closings, and cited statistics impressively confirming this. Evidently the American working
man who wants a union has enough sturdiness and sufficient confidence in the union's ability
to protect him that he is not cowed by employer threats to cease the distribution of free
doughnuts or to enforce no-smoking rules if the union comes in. We thus have considerable
doubt whether the Court contemplated that bargaining orders would be entered on the
basis of such threats alone, and indeed whether the Board would have done so here in the
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In addition, the court offered several constructive suggestions by which
the Board might resolve what had become an unnecessarily complex situ-
ation. The court suggested that the Board avail itself of its rule-making
powers to "reveal at least some of the Board's thought processes to unions,
employers, and reviewing courts, and [to] bring about a degree of
certainty and uniformity that.., does not seem to have been attained."11 7
Alternatively, the court suggested that the full Board issue an opinion
"illuminating how it meant to apply its Gissel-given authority."' s Failing
that, said the court, the Board should set forth in detail the factors in each
case which seem to preclude a fair election and in doing so, distinguish
them from other cases in which the opposite conclusion has been reached. 19
A Seventh Circuit case very similar to General Stencils was New Alaska
Development Corp. v. NLRB.120 The court remanded the case to the
Board emphasizing the same points made by Chief Judge Friendly in
General Stencils:
So far as the record shows, neither the Examiner nor the Board panel took into
consideration the "extensiveness" of the Company's election day threats and the impact
of this unlawful practice upon the election; whether the practice might recur; whether
there is only a slight possibility that the impact could be erased by "traditional rem-
edies" to ensure a fair election rerun; and whether on balance the employee sentiment
in the pre-election cards would be better protected by a bargaining order. Consequently,
we remand the case for the proper analysis of the causal connection between the unfair
labor practices and the conclusion that the election process was undermined. Upon
remand, the record alone should be the basis of the Board's "proper findings." The
Board may determine, for example, whether Kutas, Barton, and Gibson, the three
most active employees in Union drives, were likely to have been influenced by the
threats; whether the three had a timely opportunity to spread the harmful influence
among other employees; what effect, other than turnover, the time span between the
threats and the bargaining order might have upon elimination of the impact; and
whether the Company's unlawful conduct might probably recur if an election were
held.121
absence of its erroneous conclusion with respect to the unlawful interrogation of [two of
the employees]." Id. at 903.
Upon reconsideration, the Board reaffirmed its bargaining order. 195 N.L.R.B. No. 173
(March 30, 1972), 1972 CCH NLRB Dec. ff 24,024. The Board reasoned that the employer
had made not one but a series of threats, including termination of employment, which would
have affected every employee in the unit. Applying its knowledge and expertise in evaluating
the effects of unfair labor practices, the Board determined the appropriate remedy to be a
bargaining order.
117. 438 F.2d at 901-02.
118. Id. at 902.
119. Id.
120. 441 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1971).
121. Id. at 494-95 (footnotes omitted).
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NLRB v. American Cable Systems, Inc.,12  is another case where a
court of appeals took a very critical approach to the Board's issuance of
bargaining orders. In American Cable, the Board found violations of §§ 8
(a) (1), (3) and (5), based upon coercive interrogation of five employees,
promises of benefits and discharge of two admitted union supporters-all
of which followed a demand for recognition based upon cards signed by
four employees in a unit of seven. After the first hearing,12 the court set
forth a list of what it considered to be prerequired findings for the issu-
ance of a bargaining order under the Gissel doctrine. The list included:
(a) valid cards from a majority in the unit; (b) serious and extensive
employer unfair labor practices; (c) only a slight possibility that tradi-
tional remedies could insure a fair election or rerun; and (d) the finding
that employee sentiment can be best protected by a bargaining order. -4
The court remanded the case to the Board for consideration of these
factors.
On remand, the Board again issued a bargaining order, this time par-
roting the language found in Gissel. When the case again came before
the court, the court remanded, criticizing the Board for refusing to take
into consideration such factors as lapse of time, complete employee turn-
over, and departure of the only management official found to have com-
mitted the unfair labor practices, in its determination of whether or not
a fair election could be held at American Cable.1- The court in so holding
122. 427 F.2d 446 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970).
123. 414 F.2d 661 (Sth Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970).
124. 414 F.2d at 668-69.
125. 427 F.2d at 448. See also Clark's Gamble Corp. v. NLRB, 422 F.2d 845 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 868 (1970) (remanded to determine whether the passage of time
made a fair election possible). But see Henry Colder Co., 184 N.L.R.B. No. 13 (June 30,
1970), 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. ff 22,115, modified, 447 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1971), wherein the
employer petitioned the Board to reopen the record to consider employee turnover (all but
four employees had left the company). In its second supplemental decision, the Board
stated that it "interprets the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in NLRB
v. Gissel Packing Company .. . as permitting the issuance of a bargaining order where, as
here, the standards therein are met, regardless of the passage of time and the union's loss
of majority by turnover or otherwise since the commission of the unfair labor practices and
the union's demand for recognition." 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. 1 22,115, at 28,469. The Board
found American Cable to be "procedurally distinguishable." Id. at 28,469 n.3.
In NLRB v. Gibson Prods. Co., 421 F.2d 156 (Sth Cir. 1969) (per curlam), the court
remanded to the Board for consideration in light of American Cable and the guidelines set
out in Gissel. On remand, 185 N.L.R.B. No. 74 (Aug. 27, 1970), 1970 CCH NLRB Dec.
22,299, the Board respectfully disagreed with the court's American Cable holding that "no
bargaining order should issue unless at the time such an order is directed the Board 'finds
the electoral atmosphere unlikely to produce a fair election .... " 1970 CCH NLRB Dec.
II 22,299, at 28,761. To the contrary, the Board found that such a rule "would render a
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attempted to put the remedy of a bargaining order in the proper perspec-
tive:
The Court in Gissel thus placed bargaining orders based on a card majority in a
special category: an extraordinary remedy available to the Board to overcome the
polluting effects of the employer's unfair labor practices on the electoral atmosphere.
The order is not a traditional punitive remedy, but is a therapeutic one. It is not,
therefore, the type of remedy which is automatically entitled to enforcement at any time
after the occurrence of the unfair labor practice. . . .On the contrary, the Supreme
Court indicated that an open free election rather than a bargaining order is the pre-
ferred remedy if such an election is possible.' 26
L. C. Cassidy & Son, Inc. v. NLRB 127 is one of the few cases to date
in which a court has actually refused on final determination to enforce the
Board's bargaining order. 2 In Cassidy, the union demanded recognition
based upon authorization cards from seventeen of thirty-two employees
in the unit. The union petitioned for an election, which it subsequently
lost eighteen to ten. During the organization period, the employer held bi-
monthly meetings with the employees. The trial examiner found that,
although these meetings themselves did not violate the Act, and although
the employer made no threats of reprisals in the event of a union victory,
the employer did make "implied promises of benefits conditioned on re-
nunciation of the Union."' 29 The trial examiner concluded that this
conduct, in violation of § 8(a) (1), caused the dissipation of the union's
majority. Consequently, a sufficient basis for a bargaining order was estab-
lished. The trial examiner dismissed that portion of the complaint alleging
a violation of § 8(a) (5).
The court agreed that a bargaining order is an appropriate remedy for
§ 8 (a) (1) violations, but only "where the employer has engaged in flagrant
unfair labor practices so outrageous and pervasive and of such nature that
the resultant coercive effect cannot be eliminated by traditional reme-
dies. '" 9 Such was not the case here. Unlike the situation in Gissel, the
employer's refusal to bargain in this case was not compounded by threats
of reprisals and wrongful discharges, or other egregious unfair labor
practices which would preclude the holding of a fair election.
bargaining order inappropriate in a large majority of the cases where the Supreme Court
sanctioned its use." Id.
126. 427 F.2d at 448.
127. 415 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1969).
128. The court in NLRB v. Steele Apparel Co., 437 F.2d 933 (8th Cir. 1971), also re-
fused on final determination to enforce a bargaining order. The court found in that case,
however, that the order was based upon ambiguous authorization cards and also that the
employees were told that the cards would be used to get an election. Consequently, Its
consideration does not properly belong among the Gissel line of cases.
129. 415 F.2d at 1360.
130. Id. at 1365. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
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NLRB v. Drives, Inc.,131 unlike most cases, involved a large bargaining
unit, consisting of some one hundred fifty-five employees. It is of parti-
cular importance because it stands for the proposition, inter alia, that in
determining the propriety of a bargaining order the Board should not
examine isolated unfair labor practices out of context, but should deter-
mine their effect on the unit as a whole. Only in this manner can the Board
accurately determine whether or not a fair election or rerun can be held.
In Drives, the union obtained cards from eighty-four of the one hundred
fifty-five employees in the unit. Following a demand for recognition, but
prior to the employer's refusal to recognize, the union petitioned for an
election which it subsequently lost, seventy-two to fifty-three. The union
filed six unfair labor practice charges after its election loss. Of these, three
were withdrawn and two others were disallowed. The trial examiner rec-
ommended, and the Board issued, a bargaining order based on violations
of §§ 8(a)(1), (2), (3) and (5).
The Seventh Circuit determined that there were separate incidents
involving six individual employees and various incidents involving the
entire unit upon which the Board based its decision. One of the six
individuals was told that "'anyone caught signing [authorization cards]
in the plant or distributing them out would be disposed of.' "132 Another
was told that if he were caught discussing the union he could be fired, to
which he replied that he knew his rights."' A third employee was given
the impression that union activities were under surveillance and was told
that if the union were successful, the employees would lose their bonuses,
make less money and" 'the company would probably close the doors.' ,,u
That same employee was denied time off from work to attend a labor
representation proceeding and, a week later, was constructively discharged.
Another employee was also denied time off to attend the hearing and sub-
sequently resigned. A former employee who was also a union activist
was denied reinstatement despite a rapid turnover of employees. The last
of the six employees was questioned by a foreman, who was also a good
friend of the employee, about his union sentiments, and told that unioni-
zation would probably cause the company to lose customers. Other re-
marks were made to this employee which were interpreted by the trial
examiner to be threats. Finally, the trial examiner found that a wage in-
crease which the employee was to have received was withheld pending the
outcome of the election.
In addition to these individual incidents, all of which were found to be
131. 440 F.2d 354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 912 (1971).
132. 440 F.2d at 357.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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in violation of § 8 (a) (1) and, in the case of the constructive discharge, of
§ 8(a) (3), the Board found that the employer had violated § 8(a) ( 2) 18'
by illegally assisting a "so-called Advisory Board." Finally, the Board
found a violation of § 8(a) (1) in an implied promise of benefits in the
form of improved working conditions made shortly before the election.
The latter violation consisted of a survey requesting information about
the working conditions at Drives and stated that "consistent with our
financial ability" improvements would begin as soon as possible.' Also,
two days before the election, a statement was made to the effect that the
company wanted to change conditions that bother the employees." 7
The court held that the findings that the employer had violated § § 8 (a)
(1), (2) and (3) were supported by substantial evidence. In so finding,
however, it noted that of the six individuals involved, none were "actually
intimidated or even discouraged from continuing to support the union."' 8
The court also took note of the fact that statements were "hardly more
than expressions of opinion." 131 With respect to the survey and related
statements, the court agreed with the Board that these constituted an
implied promise of benefit.
Having made the above findings, the court applied them to the question
of what caused the union loss, and found that "[t]he Board directed no
attention to the possibility that Respondent's employees might well have
voted to reject the union even if Respondent had not committed any un-
fair labor practices."' 4 ° The court found that such might well have been
the case. In this respect, the court criticized the Board for, in effect, using
the language of Gissel, while applying the pre-Gissel test by automatically
finding a § 8(a)(5) violation arising out of the §§ 8(a)(1), (2) and
(3) violations.
The court, however, determined on its own that the Board's holding
was correct under Gissel standards. It held that the employer's unfair
labor practices were serious and, even absent a § 8(a)(5) violation, a
bargaining order would be appropriate. Further, the court noted that the
employer should not be permitted to profit from his wrongdoing.141 For
these reasons, the court decided to enforce the bargaining order.
135. There was, however, no contention that this violation influenced the outcome of
the election. Id. at 359.
136. Id. at 359-60.
137. Id. at 360.
138. Id. at 361.
139. Id. at 362.
140. Id. at 365.
141. Cf. NLRB v. L.B. Foster Co., 418 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
990 (1970), where the court granted enforcement despite a three-year delay. The court
held that "to deny enforcement . . . is to put a premium upon continued litigation by the
employer." 418 F.2d at 4.
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The court did point out, however, that a bargaining order alone would
not sufficiently protect the interests of the employees. As noted above,
the court indicated that it was not entirely convinced that a majority of the
employees would have, under any circumstances, voted for the union. This,
coupled with the fact that some four years had elapsed, led the Board to
modify the bargaining order by requiring that the employees be notified
of their right to reject the union after a reasonable time by petitioning for
a secret ballot election.
In NLRB v. M. H. Brown Co.,4'a the Second Circuit emphasized the
seriousness of a bargaining order by carefully examining the Board's
factual determinations. The Board had found violations of § 8(a) (1) and
§ 8(a) (3) based upon alleged interrogations of employees by the com-
pany president, promises and granting of wage increases and fringe bene-
fits, and the layoff of a seven man shift, all after the union's demand for
recognition. After reviewing the Board's findings, the court concluded
that the record did not indicate that any substantial violations of the Act
had occurred.
The court held that the employer's conversations with the employees
were protected by the rule set forth in NLRB v. Dorn's Transportation
Co., 43 in that they were held purely for general informational purposes,
and not for the purpose of obtaining information as to the union sentiment
of individual employees. The court also relied on the fact that there was
no history of hostility to unionism on the part of the employer. With respect
to the alleged illegal increase in benefits and layoffs, the court found that
the former was contemplated prior to the advent of union activity and
that the latter was caused solely by a decline in business. 4'
The importance of a bargaining order for all concerned-the union,
the employer and the employees--cannot be underestimated. As the cases
discussed in this section indicate, such an order must be firmly buttressed
by both the law and the facts. These court of appeals decisions clearly
demonstrate that, in at least some cases, the Board is not discharging its
obligations when it issues bargaining orders.
The purpose of Gissel was not to have the Board continue to apply the
Joy Silk doctrine using Gissel language. Rather the Supreme Court
intended that the Board carefully examine the effect of an unfair labor
practice upon the electoral atmosphere. The test, as Gissel makes abun-
dantly clear, is whether or not, under the totality of the circumstances, a
fair election or rerun could be held. While the Board phrases its deter-
142. 441 F.2d 839 (2d Cir. 1971)."
143. 405 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1969).
144. "[Wihere the employer asserts a business justification for the layoffs, some basis
for concluding that they were motivated at least partially by anti-union considerations must
be shown." 441 F.2d at 843.
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mination in terms of the possibility of a fair election, it has yet to focus
on the issue.
In General Stencils, the court suggested to the Board that it adopt a
consistent, clear and explicit approach to this issue.145 In Alaska Develop-
ment,'46 the court informed the Board that it was not giving sufficient
consideration to the "extensiveness" of the unfair labor practices in deter-
mining their effect upon the electoral atmosphere. In American Cable,4 7
the court warned the Board that this area of labor law is far too important
for "formalistic and perfunctory treatment." *8 In Cassidy,40 the court
found the Board's attitude toward bargaining orders to be far too frivolous
and indicated that the Board should be less quick to grant them. In
Drives,' the court made the findings and handed down the type of
analysis which the Board should have made in the first place. In M.H.
Brown, 5' the court determined that the Board was not giving adequate
consideration to all of the facts presented to it. In each case, the court has
suggested that the Board is not giving sufficient consideration to the con-
text in which the cases arise and, further, that it is not giving sufficient
consideration to mitigating factors. In short, the courts are warning the
Board that it has not properly embraced the Gissel doctrine.
III. CONCLUSION
If during the course of an organization campaign the employer commits
compound unfair labor practices (i.e., multiple violations of § 8(a) (1) or
a combination of §§ 8(a) (1) and (3) violations), and if there are no sub-
stantial mitigating factors, the Board will issue an order requiring the
employer to bargain with the union upon request. The conclusion is in-
escapable that under these circumstances the Board will inevitably find a
violation of § 8(a)(5).
In most cases, the courts will defer to the Board's expertise in fashioning
remedies and will enforce the bargaining order. Some of the more recent
cases, however, have indicated that the courts are less than satisfied with
the Board's application of the Gissel doctrine. 2 In addition to criticizing
the Board's analysis of the Supreme Court's order, the courts have
indicated that the Board may be applying the Gissel doctrine too inflexibly.
145. See text accompanying notes 117-19 supra.
146. See text accompanying notes 120-21 supra.
147. See text accompanying notes 122-26 supra.
148. 427 F.2d at 449.
149. See text accompanying notes 127-30 supra.
150. See text accompanying notes 131-41 supra.
151. See text accompanying note 142 supra.
152. See part I(D) supra.
